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A SURVEY OF LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN THE WEST INDIES:'
GUARDING AGAINST FOREIGN DOMINATION 2
I. INTRODUCTION
It is apparent from any treatise of West Indian history that the
region's past has been characterized by extra-regional domination.3 Given
the history of domination, it should come as no surprise that the Islands'
inhabitants would seek some avenues of protection against continued
domination. This Note examines the proposition that the Islands' laws
and government policies which restrict foreign ownership of land are
symptomatic of the desire on the part of their people to maintain some
semblance of control over their lives, to foster a sense of autonomy, and
to assure that their small and vulnerable economies4 are developed in a
1. It is important to note at the outset of this survey that although many of the sources
cited herein refer to the "Caribbean" and not to the "West Indies," the islands of the West
Indies are subsumed under the general geographic designation of "Caribbean." See THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987). In addition, the sources
consulted offer differing definitions of the geographical boundaries and which islands
constitute the West Indies. Two representative definitions are those offered by Philip M.
Sherlock and the World Book Encyclopedia. According to Sherlock, the designation "West
Indies" once referred to the Caribbean archipelago (stretching from the Bahamas in the
north to Trinidad and Tobago in the South), but today, the designation is limited to
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, the Leeward Islands - the Virgin Islands, Anguilla,
St. Martin, Saba, St. Christopher and Nevis [hereinafter St. Kitts-Nevis], Antigua and
Barbuda, Montserrat, Guadaloupe; and the Windward Islands - Dominica, Martinique, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada. See P. M. SHERLOCK, WEST INDIES 7 (1966).
The World Book Encyclopedia, however, defines the modern day West Indies as consisting
of three major groups of islands: The Bahamas - the Bahamas, Turks and Cacaos Islands;
The Greater Antilles - Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico; and the Lesser Antilles - the
Leeward and Windward Islands, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, Bonaire, and
Curacao (the latter three are also collectively referred to as the Netherlands Antilles). See
21 WoRLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 165 (1984). In accordance with the most recent definitions,
this Note will refer to the West Indies as defined in the World Book Encyclopedia.
2. The islands which are surveyed in this Note were chosen from among the independent
English speaking nations of the West Indies.
3. See generally, F. AUGIER, S. GORDON, D. HALL & M. RECKFORD, THE MAKING OF THE
WEST INDIES (1960) [hereinafter F. AUGIER]; E. WILLIAMS, FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO, THE
HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN, 1492-1969 (1970); F. KNIGHT, THE CARIBBEAN, THE GENESIS OF
A FRAGMENTED NATIONAUSM (1978).
4. See Crossette, The Caribbean After Grenada, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1984, § D
(Magazine), at 63, col. I ("These places cannot get along without outside investment,
outside technology. Alone, they are not viable"); Enders, A Comprehensive Strategyfor the
Caribbean Basin: The U.S. and Her Neighbors, CARIBBEAN REV., Spring 1982,'at 10, 12 (The
countries have "very major economic difficulties"); Baker & Toro-Montserrate, CBI v.
N.Y.L- ScH. J. INTL & Comp. L.
manner consistent with their long term developmental interests. The
islands which this Note will survey are: Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada,
Saint Christopher-Nevis ("St. Kitts-Nevis"), St. Vincent and the Grena-
dines, Dominica and The Bahamas (collectively the "Islands").5
HI. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Europeans first became aware of the existence of the West Indies in
1492 when Christopher Columbus landed on San Salvador (now called
Wattling Island) in the Bahamas.6 Columbus' discovery of this "new
world" marked the beginning of the region's domination by external
powers,7 a domination which continues today, though not in the
traditional colonial context of the period prior to the 1960s,8 but rather
in a dependency-based, hegemonic paradigm.9
CARICOM, The Interplay Between Two International Law Instumnents, 11 N.C. J. INT'L &
COM. REG. 3 (Winter 1986) (These islands are handicapped by their "small size, economic
fragmentation and extensive dependence on extra-regional markets and suppliers of
resources of all kinds"); E. Wuimss, supra note 3, at 512 ("IThere are obvious limits to
the scope for a more independent strategy of development in the Commonwealth Caribbean
countries because of small size"); Lewis, The U.S. and the Caribbean: Issues of Economics
and Security, CARIBBEAN REv., Spring 1982, at 6, 9 ("[k]nown facts of the small, dependent
character of Caribbean economies and their vulnerability to external political economic
pressure.").
5. Although not surveyed here, Trinidad and Tobago also restrict foreign ownership of
land (see infra note 136), as does St. Lucia. Telephone interview with Charles Flemming,
Charge d'affaires, St. Lucia Mission to the United Nations, in New York City (Sept. 22,
1988) (on file at the office of N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.) [hereinafter Flemming
Interview]. Barbados, however, does not have any restrictions on foreign ownership of land.
Telephone interview with T. Wilchire, Vice-Consul, Barbados Consulate General, in New
York City (Sept. 23, 1988) (on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.)
[hereinafter Wilchire Interview], and consistently ranks as one of the more prosperous
nations in the region. See Pelzman & Schoepfle, The Impact of the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act on Caribbean Nations' Exports and Development, 36 EcoN. DEv. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 753, 758 (July 1988).
6. See F. AUGIER, supra note 3, at 9.
7. Up to the point of Columbus' discovery of the West Indies, the Islands were inhabited
by three groups of indians: the Caribs, the Taino Arawaks, and the Ciboney or
Guanahuatebey. Although the groups sometimes raided each other to procure slaves, and
the Caribs - a migratory group from South America - had been steadily encroaching upon
the territory held by the Arawaks, no one group dominated the region. See F. KNIGHT,
supra note 3, at 6-20.
8. Cambridge, Effects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 75 MGM.rr. REv. 54, 56 (Oct. 1986).
9. F. KNIGrr, supra note 3, at 180; Michael Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica (re-
elected in national elections on Feb. 9, 1989 after an eight year rule by Edward Seaga. See
Manley Victorious, Caribbean Contact, Mar. 1989, at 2, col. 1, refers to this new colonialism
as "neocolonialism". See Manley, Grenada in the Context of History, Between Neocolonialism
and Independence, CARIBBEAN RsV., Spring 1985, at 9. The traditional colonialism model
is the physical/military control of a territory to provide the conquering nation with resources.
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With Columbus' discovery, the Spanish proceeded to build an
economic system designed to exploit the riches of the new world.10 To
accomplish this task, however, cheap labor was needed. In the first
stages of the Spanish domination of the new world, they used the native
Indians to do heavy manual work." Unfortunately, the natives were
unaccustomed to the long hours of work imposed on them by the
Spanish.12 The eventual result of the system of enslavement imposed by
the Spanish was the extermination of most of the Indian population
within a few decades of the Spanish arrival in the new world.3
The demise of the Indian population presented the Spanish with the
problem of being in possession of a vast empire without a labor force
with which to exploit it; they solved this problem by looking across the
Atlantic to Africa. 4  The people they imported from the African
continent would become the ancestors of most of today's West Indians.u
The systematic exploitation of the Caribbean by the Spanish
continued relatively unabated until the end of the 17th century. It was
at this time that other European nations began to establish a foothold in
the region,16 thus commencing the erosion of the Spanish Empire that
would continue into the 18th century. This decline was due in large part
to the rise in the fortunes of the British who began to make their
presence known in the Caribbean and particularly in the West Indies
where they acquired a foothold of several islands."
The hegemonic paradigm on the other hand involves the establishment of spheres of
influences and cultural domination (this is the concept of the Caribbean as "America's
backyard").
10. See F. KNtfOr, supra note 3, at 24.
11. See F. AuGIme, supra note 3, at 12.
12. Id. at 13.
13. Id; F. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 29.
14. See F. AuGiEs, supra note 3, at 13; F. KmIGtr, supra note 3, at 46-49. See generally
Knight & Crahan, The African Migration and the Origins of an Afro-American Society and
Culture, in AFRICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN, LEGACIES OF A LINK (M. Crahan & F. Knight eds.
1979).
15. The vast majority of the population of the West Indies is of African ancestry, but
there are many minority groups, including a substantial East Indian population which was
brought to the region at the tail end of slavery as indentured servants. See F. AUGIER,
supra note 3, at 204-10.
16. Id at 52. Before the beginning of the 17th century, many of the islands had
remained unclaimed (see id at 100) but by the end of the century most of the islands had
been claimed by either the English, French or Dutch in addition to the Spanish. Id. at 26-
34.
17. See id. at 93-97. The British had won trading concessions from the French during
the wars of the Spanish Secession (1702-13), and had been granted St. Kitts. Id. at 91.
The British later established navat bases in the islands (Port Royal in Jamaica and English
Harbour in Antigua) to protect their trading concerns. Id. at 98.
19901
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The British domination of the Islands they were ceded or had
captured from the other powers of Europe, was extensive, and it was
accomplished by the use of an administrative system, based in England,
that effectively left control of the colonies firmly in the hands of
England.'8 This is not to say, however, that the planters on the Islands
completely lacked a voice in the affairs of the colonies; they did wield
some power through Island legislative bodies.' 9
Although the British abolished the legal practice of slavery in 1838,2
it would be many more years before they saw fit to grant universal adult
suffrage to the Islands' inhabitants; 2' the period between these events was
marked by a great deal of unrest among the Islanders who had become
dissatisfied with British rule." The unrest which started with emancipa-
tion continued during the 1920s in the form of labor riots that were felt
throughout the Caribbean.23 These riots resulted in some palliatives
which were paraded before the people as "reforms."24 It is worth noting,
however, that initial enactment of many restrictions on foreign ownership
of property came from this period.25
This era of measured reform was characterized by a growth in
18. Id. at 59-60. Just as it had been with most of the other powers of Europe in their
relation to the colonies, the crucial decisions concerning "the colonies were resolved
outside the [region] in the metropolitan decision-making body." Id. And where the British
did leave some control in the hands of the local planters, such control was generally
exercised by a governor appointed by the crown. Id. at 59.
19. Id. at 59. The relationship between the Governor, who represented the interests of
the crown, and the local Assembly and Council, comprised of local planters, was often
characterized by friction and at times open hostility. In 1710, for example, one Governor
so vexed the planters of Antigua that they attacked Government House and killed him. Id.
at 103.
20. F. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 124.
21. See id. at 145 ("Until the middle of the twentieth century the masses remained
excluded from meaningful participation in their societies everywhere except in Haiti.").
Jamaicans were allowed universal adult suffrage in 1944, Barbados in 1950, and the Leeward
and Windward Islands in 1951. Id. at 221-22.
22. As the de facto system of slavery instituted by the planters after abolition (see F.
AUGIE, supra note 3, at 172) slowly unravelled, the people moved to advance and protect
their interests by forming trade unions. Id. at 271. By 1913, legally sanctioned trade unions
had arisen. Id.
23. F. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 179.
24. Id.
25. These Acts include: Aliens (Land-Holding Regulation) Ordinance, ch. 11 (Grenada
1922); Aliens (Land-Holding Regulation) Ordinance, ch. 96 (St. Vincent and the Grenadines
1922); Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102 (St. Kitts-Nevis 1923); and the Aliens
Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 105 (Antigua and Barbuda 1923) (repealed by Statutory
Rule Order No. 8 (Antigua and Barbuda 1977)). The 1923 Antigua and Barbuda Act was
no longer necessary in light of the enactment of Non-Citizens Land Holding Regulation
Act, 1968, which provided for many of the same restrictions. See Non-Citizens Land
Holding Regulation, No. 8 (Amendment), § 25 (Antigua and Barbuda 1977).
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nationalism and class consciousness. 6 World War I, with its ideals of
freedom and putting an end to oppression, transformed soldiers into
nationalist agitators who demanded some of the freedom for which they
had fought in Europe."7 This new spirit, in combination with several
other factors- the Harlem Renaissance; the United Negro Improvement
Association and its leader, Jamaican national, Marcus Garvey; the
Depression; the deterioration of West Indian sugar exports and the
closing of emigration outlets- would contribute to the end of European
colonialism in the Caribbean.28
One other significant event occurred during this period-the rise of
Representative Government Associations in most of the Islands.2 The
granting of limited self-rule grew out of the discontent with the crown
colony government, a discontent traceable to the World War.3
Although the locals did not demand self-rule,31 they did ask for a say in
their affairs and eventually, councils were formed in several islands.
32
The labor unrest of the 1920s intensified in the 1930s and spread
through the Caribbean "like fire on a windy day."33 The hardships of the
Depression also served to foster resentment of the Colonial Government,
and increased "criticism of the Colonial [G]overnment spread throughout
the West Indies."3 The unrest fostered by the Depression forced the
Colonial Office to appoint a Royal Commission, in 1938, to investigate
social and economic conditions in the colonies.35 The report issued by
the Commission concluded that broad social reform was needed in the
region.3 The Commission's recommendations, however, were largely
ignored.
37
During World War II, criticism of the colonial system continued.Y
26. F. KNIGrr, supra note 3, at 177.
27. See id. at 178.
28. Id.
29. F. AUGIER, supra note 3, at 272. The Grenada Association announced in 1921 that
the Associations common purpose was to get "such a measure of representative
governments as will enable [the people] to have an effective voice in their own govern-
ment." Id.
30. See id. at 272.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 273.
33. F. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 179.
34. F. AUGIER, supra note 3, at 277.
35. Id. at 278-83.
36. See id. at 283.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 285.
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These years also brought a boom in West Indian sugar sales to Britain,39
and after the war, a tentative movement began toward greater autonomy
in the region.4° A measured transfer of responsibility occurred in the
running of local affairs from the Colonial Office -which was responsible
for overseeing the British colonial possessions - to local elected represen-
tatives. t  The granting of universal adult suffrage was one of the first
steps in this movement to greater autonomy in the post-war years.42
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Islands' Government and the British
Government moved to the realization of a Federation of the West Indian
Islands.4 3 The concept of a federated state of the West Indies was first
raised in the period immediately following World War II.4 The Islands
moved toward the creation of the Federation out of a desire for greater
self-sufficiency and a new sense of common goals and interests.45  The
leaders of this Federation movement viewed such a proposal as a means
of achieving unity, which they hoped would eventually lead to a collective
independence.6 They also viewed such an amalgamation of small islands
into a greater whole as the shortest route to self determination. 47  The
movement to create a united, political and economic relationship in the
West Indies was slow, but in 1958 the task was completed.4 8 The
Federation failed, however, to achieve the unity and independence for
which its leading proponents had hoped, and the experiment failed within
four years of the first elections, held in 1958.49
39. Id. at 289.
40. See supra note 21; see also F. AUGIER, supra note 3, at 299. During this period the
colonial government became more willing to consider the claims of the islanders to a right
to administer their own affairs. The Colonial Office "was willing to sponsor a federation
whose political aim was self-government, but it was also willing to grant the separate islands
responsible governments based on universal adult suffrage." Id. These two aims, on their
face, are at cross-purposes. This fact certainly sheds some light on the reasons for the
demise of the West Indian Federation. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
41. Id. at 285.
42. Id. at 286.
43. Id. at 299-302.
44. See supra note 40.
45. F. Auc~iER, supra note 3, at 299.
46. Note, Integration and Independence: The Development and Role of Sub-regional
Organizations in Fostering Effective Sovereigty in the Eastern Caribbean, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L.
205, 209 (Fall 1985).
47. F. AuoiR, supra note 3, at 300.
48. Id.; Note, supra note 46, at 209. During the period between the proposition for the
formation of a West Indian Federation and the realization of the federal goverment,
individual island governments had taken the initiative and improved the standard of living
of their islands. Id. The individual islands' interested in protecting the gains they had made
during the interim period proved to be a major factor in the de-stabilization and eventual
destruction of the Federation. See id. at 301.
49. See F. KNIGr, supra note 3, at 204. Numerous theories have been offered in
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After the failure of the at Federation, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago
were granted independence by Britain,50 meanwhile, the smaller islands
entered a period of associated statehood with their colonial master.51
During this period, another important event occurred which stimulated
the desire for West Indian autonomy: the Anguillan crisis followed by the
British invasion of that small island.52 This affair fueled West Indian
resentment against intrusive foreign domination.5 3 The incident also
brought into the open the resentment felt by West Indians toward the
status of associated statehood.54  The designation merely served to
remind the Islands of their semi-colonial status,55 and they expressed
dissatisfaction with the central provision of associated statehood that
would have allowed Great Britain to intervene in their affairs at any time
the British saw fit.ss
attempts to explain the demise of the federation. According to Knight, the federation failed
because of competing forms of nationalism: the "incipient patiachiquismo" of Trinidad and
Jamaica and the "nationalism or internationalism" of the components of the federation
proposal. Id. at 205. Another commentator has asserted that the parties involved in
forming the Federation were too concerned about the form the Federation would take and
in their preoccupation with form, they instituted a structure which highlighted the worst
features of West Indian society. Id. at 206. Others have speculated that the federation
failed because it lacked local support and the disparity in wealth between the islands was
so great that the larger and relatively wealthier colonies of Trinidad and Tobago and
Jamaica felt they would be burdened by the poverty of the smaller islands. Note, supra
note 46, at 210.
50. F. AUGIER, supra note 3, at 302. During the years between the proposal that the
islands form a federation and the realization of that goal, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica
had improved their infrastructure and economic strength (Trinidad and Tobago also has oil
reserves and Jamaica has vast Bauxite reserves), therefore these islands were more prepared
than any other for independence. In addition, they did not want to be burdened by the
relatively chronic poverty in the other islands; this reluctance was instrumental in breaking
up the Federation. See H. BLuME, THE CARIBBEAN IsLANDS 76 (1968); see also supra note
40.
51. F. KNiGHT, supra note 3, at 206; Note, supra note 46, at 218. The central provision
of the status of Associated Statehood was that the islands could control their domestic
affairs while Great Britain would control their international relations. Note, supra note 46,
at 219.
52. Anguilla, which in 1969 had a population of 6000, declared its independence from
the associated state of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguila in February 1969. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1969,
at A10, col. 5. The vote was 1,739 to 4. Id A major part of the dispute involved the
Anguilla's asserted right to look after her own international affairs which were handled by
the British under the associated statehood system. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1969, at Al, col.
3; see also infra note 56 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 46, at 222. It should be
noted, however, that although the Anguilla crisis fostered a great deal of resentment in the
region, the incident was not the single factor which motivated the islands to declare their
independence, this is understandable given their utter dependence on Britain at the time.
53. See Note, supra note 46, at 222.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. West Indies Act, 1967, ch. 4, § 2. This section provided that the British government
1990]
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Not surprisingly, in this atmosphere of perceived British hostility and
external domination, the small islands of the West Indies, despite their
links to mother England, decided to opt for independence. The Bahamas
declared its independence from Great Britain in 1973;57 Grenada in
1974;38 St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979;59 Antigua and Barbuda
in 198 1;
60 St. Kitts-Nevis in 1983;61 and Dominica in 1978.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING
With independence, the former colonies became autonomous nations,
and with this new status came all the privileges and burdens attached
thereto. More importantly, however, the independence of the West
Indian islands did not signify that they were free of British domination.
It appears that the independent nations of the West Indies cannot and
do not want to be totally free of Great Britain on one hand,6 and are
increasingly turning to the United States on the other.6
The increasing dependence on the United States is due in large part
to the policies underlying the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which was aimed
shall have no responsibility for the government of any of the associated states except in
areas where " in the opinion of [the British government]." relates to external affairs or
defence. Id. § 2(1)(a). This was a unilateral provision which did not mandate that the
leaders of the island in question be consulted before the British took action.
57. Glinton, The Immovable Property (Acquisition by Foreign Persons) Act, 1981: A
Conceptual Analysis of the Relationship and Application of Policy and Principle, 9 W. INDIAN
L J. 87, 109 (1986).
58. Interview with Norma Blaize, Consul General, Grenada Consulate General, in New
York City (Nov. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Blaize Interview].
59. Note, supra note 46, at 205.
60. Marshall, National Strate for Development, Outlet, Nov. 11, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
61. Note, supra note 46, at 205. Only the smaller islands of the region, including
Anguilla, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands, remain in associated statehood with
Britain.
62. 82 R. MEYERS, WORLD BIUOoGRAPHICAL SEius: DOMINCA at xxi (1987).
63. See D. LowENTHAL, WEST INDIAN SOCIETIES 267 (1972). Lowenthal notes that fealty
still makes Barbados "little England" and that small islanders "all emulate English manners,
take pride in Commonwealth status and pursue English honors." Id. While this may be
true to a certain extent, Lowenthal's argument has been discredited by the vast majority of
commentators. See generally F. KNIGHT, supra note 3; E. WILLAMs, supra note 3; P.
SHERLOCK, WEST INDIAN NATIONS (1973); Note, supra note 46, at 233. In this context, see
also supra note 4 and accompanying text; the poor economic conditions in the islands may
explain this failure to move away from Britain following independence.
64. See P. SHERLOCK, supra note 1, at 339 (asserting that the West Indians "had moved"
out of the "metropolitan [sphere of influence] of the United Kingdom into the American
[sphere]."). Sherlock thus implies that the transition from one hegemonic power (United
Kingdom) to another (United States) is now complete. See also Cambridge, supra note 8,
at 54.
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at preventing European intervention in the Americas and later evolved
into a justification for American intervention in the region. 6 The change
is also due to the overwhelming United States presence in the region
militarily,66 economically,67 and culturally. 68
The modem day West Indies may be characterized as a region in
search of an end to the cycle of dependency under which it currently
exists.69 The newly independent states are in a vulnerable economic
position because they lack the markets, technologies, and natural
resources necessary to reduce their dependence on foreign power.
70
West Indians know they have no economic or political security,71 but
as pointed out, "[ihe reduction of dependency [i.e. augmenting security]
is almost certainly incompatible with the goal of rapid economic
growth." 72 The simple fact is that in countries the size of these islands,
an unregulated economic environment would be alien and impractical,7
65. See H. BLUME, supra note 50, at 72.
66. The United States has several air and/or naval bases on several islands. In addition
to the old installations on Cuba (Guantanamo), Puerto Rico and St. Thomas, United States
Virgin Islands, the United States has bases in Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua and the Bahamas.
H. BLUME, supra note 50, at 72. These bases are strategically located to protect the entire
Western Hemisphere in accordance with the tenets of the Monroe doctrine. See id.
67. The United States is the regions largest trading partner and supplies the region with
most of its major foreign currency earners: tourists. See The Caribbean, ECONOMIST, Aug.
6, 1988 at 3, 16 [hereinafter The Caribbean].
68. The proximity of the United States, the recent technological revolution in
communications and the influx of tourists from the United States mainland have all
combined to instill American ideas and customs into the people. Id. at 4. This American
influence is so pervasive that it dominates the entire region. Id.
69. Segal, The Caribbean in die Year 2000, CARmBEAN Rav., Summer 1979, at 7, 45
("[Djependency is a constant feature of all Caribbean countries," and the desire to reduce
this cycle of dependency ranks next to equity as a goal in the Caribbean."). As a recent
publication produced by the Grenada Industrial Development Corporation noted, "Grenada
is ... dependent upon the external forces of international business and finance for its
development and growth." GRENADA IND. DEV. CORP., A BUSINESS OPPORTUNrrY AwArrs
YOU IN GRENADA 2 (1986). The majority of the islands in the West Indies, like Grenada,
lack extensive natural resources and are in the same position.
70. Segal, supra note 69, at 45; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71. P. SHERLOCK, supra note 1, at 5.
72. Segal, supra note 69, at 46. Rapid economic development is incompatible with the
reduction of dependency because "even with subregional or regional organization[s], [the
region] simply lacks the markets, technologies, and natural resources to substantially reduce
its dependence." Id. If the region were to attempt a rapid development of its economy,
it would entail a greater degree of dependence because of rising debt obligations and the
fact that it does not have the markets resources or technologies to maintain such a rapid
growth.
73. Friedland, Grenada's Stab at Free Enterprise: A Slow Start, a Chancy Future, N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1984, at C3, col. 3.; see also E. WILLIAIS, supra note 3, at 512 (noting that
although an open economic system in such new countries would be "extremely difficult"
1990]
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as well as fatal to the developmental goals of the inhabitants because
their share in the island would be reduced with the influx of unregulated
foreign investment.74
Another constraint on West Indian autonomy is the increasing
influence of the United States in the economic and social affairs of these
tiny susceptible states.75 This increased influence was at once welcomed
and despised:
West Indians had moved out of the metropolitan orbit [sphere
of influence] of the United Kingdom into the American orbit,
and they both welcomed and resented the fact. They have
always had a 'love-hate' relationship with [the United States]
that was for so many West Indians a land of opportunity and a
land where they met insults and discrimination.76
With the passing from the British sphere into the American sphere
came increased economic contacts between the West Indies and the
United States," and with this increased economic contact, a concern has
developed that the Islands are moving into a relationship much akin to
colonialism.7 As Dr. Eric Williams, the late Prime Minister of Trinidad
and Tobago, 79 observed:
because of their small size - openness would make them vulnerable to manipulations from
the old world (presumably the United Kingdom), the new world (presumably the United
States) and international business interests - such an open strategy is not altogether
impossible).
74. Interview with Telbert King, Trade and Investment Promotion Officer, Antigua and
Barbuda Mission to the United Nations, in New York City (Sept. 22, 1988) [hereinafter
King Interview]; Telephone interview with Dr. Adley Meguid, Economic Advisor, the St.
Kitts-Nevis Mission to the United Nations, in New York City (Sept. 22, 1988) [hereinafter
Meguid Interview]; Blaize Interview, supra note 58. (Transcripts of these interviews are on
file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L.). An unregulated economic
environment may prove fatal to the developmental goals of the inhabitants of the islands
because as foreign investment increases, governments will be pressed to tailor policies to
the needs and desires of the investors, thereby making the goals of the inhabitants
secondary. Id.
75. See P. SHEaOCK, supra note 63, at 339. The Caribbean Basin Initiative (see infra
note 77), the invasion, and extended occupation of Grenada demonstrate the influence of
the United States in the region.
76. P. SHERLOCK, supra note 63, at 339.
77. This increased economic contact is illustrated by the Generalized System of
Preferences (established by the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982)), which
provided that many of the products of the Caribbean would be eligible to enter the United
States duty-free, and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, 19 U.S.C. §
2701 (1983). See also Caribbean Trade, 8 CARMBBFAN DATELINE, June 17, 1988, at 1.
78. See Manley, supra note 9.
79. Dr. Williams died in 1981 while in office. Interview with Babooram Rambisoon,
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Metropolitan [i.e. industrialized nation] economic assistance can
serve to promote the objective of Commonwealth Caribbean
economic integration, if such assistance is directed towards
unifying the region and making it ultimately more independent
economically. On the other hand, metropolitan aid designed to
protect metropolitan political, diplomatic or commercial interests
in the region will not only be a divisive factor but will serve to
perpetuate the present deep-seated patterns of dependence °
This view was echoed by Vauhan A. Lewis, Director General of the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (the "O.E.C.S."), who noted
that when the purse strings are controlled by an extra-regional en-
tity - whether a country or a financial entity - there will sometimes arise
the perception among the people of the region affected that the powerful
extra-regional force - and here Lewis points to the United States - is
engaging in de-stabilization efforts to meet its goals in the region.81
A recent development which relates directly to the economic
relationship between the United States and the West Indies, and to a
lesser extent to issues of West Indian autonomy,n is the Caribbean
Economic Recovery Act of 19833 (the "CBI Act"). The goal of the CBI
Act is, ostensibly, to improve the living conditions in the region, to spur
economic development, and to obtain political and social stability.8
Contrary to the expectations President Reagan may have had, however,
the CBI Act did not "set the region afire with enthusiasm." aS
Upon President Reagan's proposal for a Caribbean Basin Initiative,
there were warnings and cries afoul from many sectors in North America
and the Caribbean.86 The responses ranged from complaints that the
Consul General, Trinidad and Tobago Consulate General in New York City (Nov. 11, 1988)
thereinafter Rambisoon Interviewl (copy of transcript on file at the office of the N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.).
80. E. WIuAmS, supra note 3, at 513.
81. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 9 (noting that these goals are often couched in terms of
"hemispheric security").
82. Caribbean Basin Economic Research Act of 1983, 14 U.S.C. § 2701 (1983). The
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (the "CBI Act") relates to issues of West Indian
Autonomy because there is a fear that the measure is nothing more than an American
initiative to maintain its control of the regions economic and political development. See
supra note 80-81 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 77.
84. Baker & Toro-Montserrate, supra note 4; see also Clasen, The Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovey Act and its Implications for Foreign Private Investnen 16 N.Y.U. J. INV'L
L. & POL 715 (1983-84).
85. Clasen, supra note 84.
86. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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Initiative would not do enough,87 to admonitions that the plan was
nothing more than an unabashed attempt to increase American influence
in the region.88
The heads of governments in the Caribbean Economic Community
(the "CARICOM") expressed their gratitude for the CBI Act but also
noted that they hoped that the plan would not undermine regional
integration efforts.9e Other nations, namely Mexico and Canada, have
voiced their concern that the Initiative had failed to include any serious
consultation with the governments of the region and was being used as
an ideological tool directed against particular countries, rather than as a
method aimed at improving the economic and social conditions of the
region.9 This sentiment was echoed by the members of CARICOM.91
Church organizations and small business groups in the Caribbean have
voiced their concerns that the CBI Act only serves to enhance American
control in the region, open the door to the increased participation of
American multinationals in the local economies, and increase the
dependence of the region on the United States. 2
The CBI Act provides in part that the President of the United States
has absolute discretion in designating a Caribbean country as a beneficia-
ry" (i.e., eligible to receive the benefits of the Act9). The President
87. See Clasen, supra note 84, at 716.
88. Id. at 718.
89. Baker & Toro-Montserrate, supra note 4, at 11.
90. Id. at 14.
91. See Feinberg, Newfarmer & Orr, The Battle Over The CBI, The Debate In Washington,
CARIBBEAN REV., Spring 1983, at 15, 47.
92. Id; see also Fiszman, Foreign Investment Law: Encouragement Versus Restraint--
Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 8 HASTINGS INl' & COMP. L. REv. 147,174
(1985).
93. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1)(A) (1988).
94. The benefits of the CBI Act provide for duty free entry of the products of the
designated beneficiary countries if such article is "the growth, product or manufacture" of
the beneficiary country. An article falls under this definition if:
A) that article is imported directly from a beneficiary country into the
customs territory of the United States; and
B) the sum of (i) the cost or value of the material produced in a beneficiary
country or two or more beneficiary countries plus (ii) the direct costs of
processing operations performed in a beneficiary country or countries is
not less than 35 per centum of the appraised value of such article at the
time it is entered.
Id. § 2703. Section 2703 further provides that certain items shall not be afforded special
treatment:
b) The duty-free treatment provided under this chapter shall not apply to -
1) textile and apparel articles which are subject to textile agree-
ments;
2) footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and leather
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also has the authority to terminate the benefits to the country on sixty
days' notice to the Congress and Senate.95 This provision of the CBI Act
gives the President broad discretionary authority in deciding which
country will benefit from the Act,96 and may be one of the reasons for
much of the apprehension expressed by the Island about the Act:
[T]he broad authority given to the President to exclude or limit
the benefits to uncooperative governments are two of the reasons
why the measure appears motivated as much by political or
security considerations (communist expansion) as by a genuine
interest in fostering economic development.9 [In addition], the
President is given enormous leeway to exclude or include certain
countries for [any] subjective reasons not intended to be
considered. The controversy that surrounded intimations by the
Administration that Grenada (prior to the U.S. invasion) . . .
would not be eligible for the designation under the Act il-
lustrates how the President can use the designation process to
advance his political or foreign policy objectives in a manner
which the Act did not contemplate.96
The potential for abuse of the Act is also illustrated by the cancellation
of trade agreements with Trinidad and Tobago following their outspoken
condemnation of the invasion of Grenada led by the United States in
wearing apparel not designated at the time of the effective date
of this chapter as eligible articles for the purpose of the
generalized systems of preferences under title V of the Trade Act
of 1974;
3) tuna, prepared or preserved in any manner, in airtight containers;
4) petroleum, or any product derived from petroleum, provided for
in headings 2709 and 2710 of the TSUS; or
5) watches and watch parts (including cases, bracelets and straps),
of whatever type including but not limited to mechanical, quartz
digital or quartz analog, if such watches or watch parts contain
material which is the product of any country with respect to
which TSUS column 2 rates of duty apply.
Id.
95. Id. § 2702(A)(2) provides:
If the president has designated any country as a beneficiary country for purpose
of this chapter, he shall not terminate such designation (either by issuing a
proclamation for that purpose or by issuing a proclamation which has the effect
of terminating such designation) unless, at least sixty days before such
termination, he has notified the House of Representatives and the Senate and
has together with their considerations entered into such designation.
Id.
96. See Baker & Toro-Montserrate, supra note 4, at 14; Clasen, supra note 84, at 741.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 726.
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1983.9
The United States-led invasion is another important development in
the contemporary setting which relates directly to West Indian autonomy
interests. 10 Although some West Indian forces did invade the island with
the American troops, the operation was not unanimously received by the
heads of states and leading figures in the region.10 1 Of the thirteen
member-nations of CARICOM, four were vehemently opposed to the
United States-led action.
102
As O.E.C.S. Director General Vauhan Lewis pointed out, some of
the ill feelings resulting from the United States-led incursion may have
been caused by the perception by many in the Caribbean that the United
States uses its military option too often to remedy what are essentially
regional economic problems. 1m Lewis asserts that
99. Baker & Toro-Montserrate, supra note 4, at 12. In the years that have passed since
the enactment of Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, the benefits to the
region have been mixed. According to the United States International Trade Commission
(the "Commission") (Annual Report on the Impact of the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act on U.S. Industries and Consumers, Investigation No. 332-227 Publication 2122,
Sept. 1988), the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 has not had a wholly
positive impact on the region: "[T]he value of imports from [Caribbean Economic Recovery
Act of 1983] beneficiaries declined from $8.8 billion in 1983 to $6.1 billion in 1986 and $6.0
billion in 1987." Id. at 1. The Commission speculates that this drop was the result of
steeply falling United States imports of crude and refined petroleum products. Id. At the
same time, U.S. exports to the region amounted to $6.7 billion, while imports were $6.0
billion resulting in a trade surplus with the designated beneficiaries. Id. The fact of a trade
surplus with the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983 countries distinguished
the region as one of the few areas in the world where the United States recorded a trade
surplus. Id. at 12. The Commission also noted that the countries of the region are not
taking full advantage of Caribbean Economic Recovery Act of 1983 due in part to the
perception by many in the region that the United States would implement protectionist
measures should any venture under Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983
become successful. Id. at 5.
100. On Oct. 25, 1983, United States Marines, Army Rangers and the small forces of
several Caribbean nations landed on the 133 square mile island of Grenada in order to
"protect innocent lives" and in response to the requests of the several Caribbean nations
who asked that the United States take action. See Kenworthy, Grenada as Theater, 1
WORLD POL'Y J. 635, 641-42 (Spring 1983).
101, See Treaster, Quarrelling Caribbean Nations Meet, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1984 at A3,
col. 1; see also Manley, supra note 9; Barrow, The Danger of Rescue Operations, CARIBBEAN
REv. 3 (1985). Mr. Barrow was the Prime Minister of Barbados (1966-1976) and led that
country until his death in 1986 after his election to office in the same year. Wilchire
Interview, supra note 5.
102. Treaster, supra note 101.
103. See Lewis, supra note 4 at 8. In addition to the United States-led invasion of
Grenada, the United States was involved in: a rescue mission in the Dominican Republic
in 1965 and an occupation action from 1916 to 1924; the aborted attempt at the Bay of
Pigs, Cuba, in 1961; and an occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934. See F. KNIGHT, supra
note 3, at 220-23; see also Grenada Revisited, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1986, § A(Editorial), at
22, col. 1 ("Too often in the Caribbean, the United States has reached for the gun to
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what the United States policy makers see as a crisis of regional
security -specifically of Cuban communist expansion into a weak
area -... can more usefully be seen (and many in the Carib-
bean prefer to see) as a slowly developing crisis of economic and
social (dis)organization implicit in the economic and social
development strategies of the 1960s and maturing at the present
time.104
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The five countries addressed in this Note all have a law-making
framework that involves many people at many levels of the law enact-
ment and policy implementation process (Le., there is a great deal of
community involvement in the law-making system despite the fact that
the laws and policies are ultimately promulgated by Parliament).Y0 As
Phillip Sherlock, an author and frequent commentator on West Indian
issues notes:
In exercising policy and putting legislation into effect, the
governments in all the islands make use of local government
institutions and of a number of statutory boards created to carry
out special tasks. Industrial and Agricultural Development
Corporations, School Boards, Public Service Commissions, and
scores of voluntary and semi-government organizations indicate
an active concern among West Indian people with their own
affairs. 06
In addition, all five nations have British style parliamentary democratic
governments.107
A. The Bahamas
The Immovable Property (Acquisition by Foreign Persons) Act, 1981
(the "Property Act"),10 was enacted by the Bahamas legislature on April
support a feeble diplomacy .. ").
104. Lewis, supra note 4, at 8.
105. See P. SHERiocK, supra note 1, at 94.
106. Id.
107. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1983, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1988),
which requires that a beneficiary be non-Communist.
108. An Act to Regulate the Acquisition of Immovable Property By Foreign Persons,
3 July 1981 (Bahamas 1981) [hereinafter Immovable Property Act].
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3, 1981, and took effect on November 1, 1983.109 The stated objectives
of the Property Act are to "supervise, control and regulate the acquisi-
tion, holding and disposal of immovable property in the Bahamas." i"'
The policy considerations at the base of these objectives are to advance
Bahamian economic and social interests by controlling land ownership for
the benefit of the people of the Bahamas and controlling the develop-
ment of the economy."'
The concern for local control and development is evident in the
Property Act.11 It provides that any foreign person"3 wishing to acquire
land in the Bahamas, whether through a purchase arrangement or by
trustee and grantee arrangement, must acquire a permit issued by the
Foreign Investment Board, consisting of the Prime Minister, as the
Chairman, and other ministers of government appointed by him.
114
109. CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS, THE IMMOVABLE
PROPERTYe (AcQusiTION By FOREIGN PERSONS) Acr, 1981 (1988) [hereinafter BAHAMAS
Policy PAPER] (a copy of the pamphlet is on file at the office of the N.Y.L SCH. J. INT'L
& COMP. L.).
110. Id. Immovable Property is defined as including "land covered by water, land of any
tenure, and tenements and hereditenements, corpeal or incorpeal and houses and other
buildings and also an undivided share in land ...." Immovable Property Act, supra note
108, § 2(1)(d).
111. Dyer, Immovable Property Act 1981 of the Bahamas: A Commentary, 19 CoMP.
JuluD. Ra. 125 (1982).
112. As Professor Dyer notes, "The Bahamas, like Malta, Bermuda and other small
nation states, has decided it can no longer tolerate land acquisition and use by foreigners
without consideration for the developmental goals of the country." Id at 128.
113. A person is inclusively defined as any public body and any body of persons
corporate or unincorporated. A foreign person is a person who is not a citizen of the
Bahamas, or a company incorporated in the Bahamas where any of its shares or capital is
beneficially owned by a foreign person, or where it is in any manner controlled by a foreign
person, any company incorporated outside the Bahamas, and international organizations.
See Immovable Property Act" supra note 108, § 2.
114. The Immovable Property Act provides:
(a) no foreign person shall acquire or hold any immovable property in The
Bahamas except under the authority a permit granted to such foreign
person by the Board; and every conveyance which is not made under
the authority of a permit purporting to convey any immovable property
to any foreign person shall be null and void and without effect for
purposes of law and in regard to all persons and no interest whatsoever
whether legal or equitable shall pass to such foreign person by reason
of such conveyance or any other matter but the foreign person shall
be entitled to recover with such legitimate deductions as may be
justified in law any and all moneys paid by him as consideration for the
said conveyance;
(b) no person shall convey any immovable property to another person as
trustee or a grantee to the uses of, a foreign person or otherwise
transfer any immovable property for the benefit of a foreign person
except under the authority of a permit granted to such trustee of
grantee by the Board; and every conveyance purporting to convey any
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Although it would seem that the law is firm in its commitment that
no foreign person shall acquire land in the Bahamas, this is simply not
the case.115 It is clear from the Property Act that the government of the
Bahamas is not prohibiting a foreign person to buy land, but is im-
plementing a policy "of reporting and regulation [of] foreign acquisition
of immovable property to preserve one of its major assets and to
accomplish its goal of economic and social betterment for its citizens." 1"6
Another important objective of the Property Act is to put an end, or
at least limit, land speculation which is seen as posing a threat to
national sovereignty. The practice is seen as a subversive and exploita-
tive force because such speculation could eventually price locals out of
the real estate market and thereby adversely affect the national economy
and the locals' interest in their country.1 17  The goal of limiting land
speculation is reflected in the provision of the Property Act which
requires that a person who has acquired a permit must use the permit
within twelve months of its acquisition.118
The Property Act also places numerous restrictions on corporations.
The restrictions are extensive and go farther than some commentators
think acceptable."9 The objection to the treatment of corporations under
the Property Act is that the restriction on foreigners discriminates
between corporations held by foreigners and those held by Bahamian
nationals. It is asserted that this provision runs contrary to the notion
that a corporation takes on the nationality of the state in which it is
incorporated.'" Specifically, the Property Act provides that where shares
immovable property to a trustee or grantee, and is not in accordance
with the terms of a permit, shall be null and void and be without effect
for all purposes of law and in regard to all persons.
d. f 5(1)(a),(b); see also BAHAMAS POuCY PAPER, supra note 109, at 1.
115. Section 5(2) of the Immovable Property Act provides: Notwithstanding what is
provided in subsection (1) the Board may in its absolute discretion and on such terms and
conditions as it may think fit validate any purported conveyance made contrary to the
provisions of subsection (1) by issuing a permit to the foreign person for the conveyance
.... " Immovable Property Act, supra note 108, § 5(2).
116. Dyer, supra note 111, at 129. This goal is also affirmed by Section 6(4) of the
Immovable Property Act:
Where immovable property owned by a foreign person is used by that foreign per-
son as his usual place of residence in the Bahamas the provisions of this Act shall not
affect any acquisition of that property by device or any falling into possession of an
estate or interest in remainder expectancy or reversion in respect of that property
where such acquisition is by, or such falling into possession in favor of, the spouse,
child, grandchild, parent, brother, sister, niece, nephew of that foreign person....
Immovable Property Act, supra note 108, § 6(4).
117. Glinton, supra note 57, at 89; see also H. BLuME, supra note 50, at 117.
118. Immovable Property Act, supra note 108, 1 10.
119. Glinton, supra note 57, at 120.
120. Id
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in the corporation are owned, or held beneficially by a foreign person,
or where the company is in any manner, controlled directly or indirectly,
by one or more foreign persons, it is to be distinguished from other
Bahamian companies and citizens for purposes of the Act and therefore
would be subject to its provisions.
121
The Property Act demonstrates that the primary intent of the
Bahamian legislature is to protect the limited land resources of the
Bahamas and to further the goal of autonomy. Prior to the enactment
of the statute, land in the Bahamas could be bought and sold without
consideration for the concerns of the local population.12 The statute,
therefore, gives the government an important weapon in its fight to
maintain a measure of local control over the pace of its development and
the path that development will take.
Although the act has been in effect six years, there have been no
challenges to its constitutionality, and the government has not amended
any of its provisions since its passage."'
B. Grenada
Laws restricting ownership of land in Grenada have been in effect
since 1922.Y2 These early laws, however, limited ownership of land to
"British subject[s]."'2 Today, the Grenada law requires that a foreigner
seeking to purchase property in Grenada for any purpose must obtain an
Aliens Land-Holding Licence by application to the Cabinet.126 Like the
Property Act of the Bahamas, the Grenada Act provides that the
Governor in Council has the absolute discretion to give to an alien the
right to obtain land. 127 The Grenada Act also provides that any breach
of the provisions of the Act will result in a reversion of title to the
property to the government of Grenada.'2 The Grenada law has many
provisions for determining if a company is under alien control; primary
among these determining factors is whether any of the company's
directors is an unlicensed alien.129
121. Immovable Property Act, supra note 108, § 2.
122. See H. BwM, supra note 50, at 117.
123. See THE FACULTY OF LAw LIBRARY, UNIV. OF TH WEST INDIES, BARBADOS,
BAHAMAs: CONSOLIDATED INDEX OF STATUrES AND SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 39 (1988).
124. See supra, note 25.
125. Aliens (Land-Holding Regulation) Ordinance, ch. 11, § 2 (Grenada 1922).
126. Id. § 3(1).
127. Id. § 4(1).
128. Id. § 4(2). In addition, a forfeiture to the government (which must be obtained by
judgment against the alien holder of the property, see § 5(1)). The government will be
vested with all the rights the alien had in the land. Id. § (2).
129. Id. § 6(1)(a). This condition by itself would be sufficient to require a company to
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The importance of preserving local control over limited resource of
land on a 133-square-mile island is evident in the Grenada Act.m The
purpose of restricting foreign ownership of land in this manner is to
maintain a sense of national identity among the people of Grenada.131
Although there are numerous restrictions on ownership and acquisi-
tion of property in Grenada, the government actively seeks foreign
investment1 2 But what remains apparent from the laws restricting
foreign ownership of land, is that the government is willing to forego
some growth opportunities in order to maintain some sense of autono-
my. 133
obtain a land-holding licence. See id. Other provisions which would require the Alien to
obtain a license are:
(b) if more than one-third of the votes exercisable at any meeting of the
company or which would be exercisable if a meeting of the company
were held are vested in unlicensed aliens, or
(c) in the case of a company having a share capital, in more than one third
of the nominal amount of its issued shares are held by unlicensed aliens
or,
(d) in the case of a company not having a share capital is more than one-
third in number of its members are unlicensed aliens, or
(e) if the amount paid or payable in any period of twelve months as
dividends to those members of the company who are unlicensed aliens
exceeds one-third of the total amount paid or payable by the company
as dividends in the same period, or
(f) if more than one-third of the nominal value of the outstanding
debentures (defined as including every mortgage or change by a
company, whether floating or otherwise, on any of the company's
property or on its undertaking or on its uncalled capital and also every
obligation by the company (not being a bill of exchange or promissory
note) for the payment of a debt or the payment of money lent or to
be lent, and also debenture stock- see sec (2)) of the company are
held by unlicensed aliens, or
(g) if the annual interest on the debentures of the company for the time
being held by unlicensed aliens exceeds one-third of the annual interest
on all the debentures of the company for the time being outstanding.
Id § 6(1)(b)-(g).
130. According to Norma Blaize, the Grenadian Consul General, foreign investors
usually want an average of five to ten acres of land and usually require that their neighbors
be involved in similar enterprises as they are. This can present a great deal of difficulty
when the current neighbors happen to be people. Another problem with large scale foreign
investment in small countries is that with such a great influx of money, conflicts between
investor goals of creating an environment where they can maximize profits, and government
goals of orderly development often clash. Blaize Interview, supra note 58.
131. Id In this context, it is important to note that most Grenadians own their own
land and therefore feel a certain attachment to it; the laws which restrict foreign ownership
and acquisition of land thus assure the people of a certain degree of stability. Id.
132. Friedland, supra note 73. The Grenadian Consul General also notes that foreign
investors are encouraged by the government to lease land on a long term basis. Blaize
Interview, supra note 58.
133. See Segal, supra note 69, at 47. This view was echoed by the Grenadian Consul
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C. Antigua and Barbuda
Antigua and Barbuda restricts foreign ownership of land through the
Non-Citizens Land Holding Regulation Act, 1968-No. 17 of 196813 (the
"Land Act"). The Land Act is similar to the Grenada Act, 35 however
the practical application of the two statutes vary between Antigua and
Barbuda and Grenada. One example of this difference is exemplified in
an Antiguan and Barbudan government policy that land in Barbuda may
not be brought by any non-Barbudan; this edict includes Antiguans.'3
Similar to Grenada and the Bahamas, such laws and policies are
implemented for "the protection of the people in a poor country." 31
The concern is that if the land is available for anyone to purchase, local
control of the everyday affairs would be non-existent, and the people
would reach the point where they would not own or have any rights to
the land on which they lived.13
Despite the presence of restrictions on foreign ownership of land in
the legislative code of Antigua and Barbuda, foreigners seem to be able
to buy land rather easily. This is in due to the enormous amount of
discretion held by the Prime Minister in granting a land holding
licence.139 In one incident involving the exercise of this discretion, the
people of Antigua took issue with the government sale of fifty-three
acres of land for the sum of U.S.$100 to a German national. 40 Despite
petitions, demonstrations and meetings with the Prime Minister, the sale
general. Blaize Interview, supra note 58.
134. Non-Citizen Land Holding Regulation Act, No. 17 (Antigua and Barbuda 1968).
135. This is to be expected in light of the common colonial ancestry of the islands.
136. King Interview, supra note 74. Since this is merely a government policy however,
it necessarily follows that should the government see fit to sell Barbudan land to foreigners,
there would be no statutory bar against its doing so. See also infra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text.
137. King Interview, supra note 74.
138. Id. This view is shared by Babooram Rambisoon, Consul General of the Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago. He points out that the laws in the various islands are designed
for self protection and notes, "There [is not] a lot [of land] and we [do not] want to have
foreigners coming in and telling us what to do." Rambisoon Interview, supra note 79.
Trinidad and Tobago regulates foreign ownership of land through the Aliens (Land
Holding) Act No. 36 of 1921, ch. 58.02 (Trinidad and Tobago 1921), which contains many
of the same provisions as the Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and
Grenada Ordinances. This similarity includes the vesting of an enormous amount of
authority to grant a license in a single government official. See § 4(1).
139. See Aliens (Land Holding) Act No. '36 of 1921, ch. 58. 02, § 4(1) (Antigua and
Barbuda 1921).
140. Bolans Take Issue with Foreign Advaiurer, Outlet, Sept. 2, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
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of the land went forward nonetheless. 141 This incident demonstrates that
the enormous discretion given to the Prime Minister can result in the
sale of property, a practice locals view as being detrimental to their
interests. The incident also demonstrates that this discretion leaves
Antiguans and Barbudans with little recourse should they object to the
sale of land.
D. St. Vincent and The Grenadines
The laws of St. Vincent and the Grenadines are much the same as
those of Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada. The Aliens (Land Holding
Regulation) Ordinance (1922) (the "Land Ordinance"), amended by
Statutory Rule Orders 3 and 7, 1978, provides that neither land nor a
mortgage on land in St. Vincent and the Grenadines may be held by any
unlicensed non-citizen.142 The Land Ordinance also provides for the
granting of a license to a non-citizen by the Cabinet at its absolute
discretion.143
Once again, it is evident that the interest in guarding against foreign
domination is paramount in the retention of this statute by St. Vincent
and the Grenadines after they gained independence. The continued
existence of this restrictive ordinance also illustrates that the islands are
willing to sacrifice some economic growth interests in order to retain
some sense of autonomy over their everyday affairs.1" According to Mr.
Cecil John, Senior Assistant Secretary in the Office of Foreign Affairs of
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the local concern is for autonomy and
orderly, labor-intensive development.ld
141. Id.
142. Aliens (Land-Holding Regulation) Ordinance, ch. 96, § 3 (St Vincent and the
Grenadines 1922). This section in relevant part provides that subject to the provisions of
this ordinance, neither land, nor a mortgage on land shall after the commencement of the
ordinance be held by an unlicensed non-citizen .... ." Id.
143. Id. at § 4(1). The section provides that the Cabinet may
from time to time, grant to any alien a licence to hold land as owner or tenant
or mortgagee for any estate or interest, either subject to any conditions or not:
Provided that a licence shall be operative only as to the land described and as
to the estate or interest specified therein, and shall be of no force or effect until
registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds.
Id.
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145. Telephone interview with Cecil John, Senior Assistant Secretary in the Office of
Foreign Affairs, St. Kitts-Nevis Mission to the United Nations, in New York City (Oct. 3,
1988)(on file at the office of the N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMp. L.). Charles Flemming,
Charge d'affaires, St. Lucia mission to the United Nations, asserts that although St. Lucia
has the same interests it has chosen to routinely grant Aliens land-holding licenses in its
development scheme. Flemming Interview, supra note 5. Today St. Lucia is seen as one
of the rising stars in the Caribbean Community. The Caribbean, supra note 67, at 11-12.
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The Land Ordinance is complemented by the Land Development
Control Ordinance of 1968 (the "Development Ordinance"). 1 6  The
Development Ordinance provides that every person must seek the written
approval of the Development Control Authority (the "Authority") before
commencing the development of any land in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines; this edict includes locals. 147 The Ordinance further provides
that once the Authority has given its approval to a development plan,
the developer must proceed in accordance with the plans.14 Violations
of the Development Ordinance are punishable by a fine not to exceed
$U.S.2,000. There is an additional fine of $U.S.50 a day in cases where
the violation continues.
149
When the Development Ordinance is viewed in light of the Land
Ordinance, the concern for locally controlled development is readily
apparent. The two acts demonstrate a continuing and long-term
commitment to controlling the development of St. Vincent's small and
vulnerable economy.
E. St. Kitts-Nevis
St. Kitts-Nevis, the most recently independent of the new nations in
the West Indies,m restricts foreign ownership of land through the Aliens
Land Holding Regulation Act (the "St. Kitts-Nevis Act"). 15 As one
would expect, given the similar developmental paths of the West Indian
islands,uZ the laws of St. Kitts-Nevis are very similar to those of Antigua
and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada. As with the
other acts studied thus far, the St. Kitts-Nevis Act provides that the
Cabinet may, "if it thinks fit" grant an alien "a licence to hold land as
owner or tenement of mortgage for any estate or interest either subject
to any conditions or not . . ."Is' The provisions in the Act for
determining when a company will be deemed to be under alien control
are identical to the provisions in the laws of Grenada .)
4
146. Land Development Control Ordinance, Cap. 18, tit. XVIII (St. Vincent 1968).
147. Id. § 4.
148. Id. § 13.
149. Id. § 18(3).
150. See supra notes 57-62 atd accompanying text.
151. Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102 (St. Kitts-Nevis 1923).
152. See genera/ly F. KNIGfT, supra note 3.
153. Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102, § 4(1) (St. Kitts-Nevis 1922).
154. See Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102, § 6(a)-(g) (St. Kitts-Nevis 1922);
cf. Aliens (Land Holding Regulation) Ordinance, ch. 11, § 6(a)-(g) (Grenada 1922). Again,
given the common colonial heritage of the islands, the striking similarities in the laws is not
unexpected. There is one notable difference between the two laws however, the St. Kitts-
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The St. Kitts-Nevis Act also provides that though a person remains
an unlicensed alien holding land in St. Kitts-Nevis, he may continue to
hold it on an annual tenancy basis.55 He may also hold it for one year
if it is acquired by will or intestacy.'
In the case of a mortgage acquired by an unlicensed alien, under a
will or intestacy, the alien may not foreclose or take possession of the
land unless he first obtains a licenseU7 Although the Act provides that
the interest of a judgment creditor shall not be affected by anything in
the Act, it further asserts that the "debtors land shall not be acquired by
an unlicensed alien."Ls
Although the provisions in the Act appear to make the acquisition
of property for any purpose a difficult proposition, it is important to
note that recent developments in St. Kitts-Nevis have made the acquisi-
tion of land by foreign persons for investment purposes much easier.
One such development is the implementation of a government policy,
called the "Frigate Bay Development" project.Y9 This project will create
a set-aside area of the country where the restrictions on alien landhold-
ing will be relaxed, and taxes on land purchase will not be levied.160 The
goal of this policy is to foster development of the tourist industry.
1 61
The Act, when viewed in light of the above point, vividly
demonstrates the dual and at times inconsistent goals of encouraging
development while restricting the involvement of foreign persons in the
Nevis law defines an alien as including the government of a foreign state "for the purpose
of enabling the Government of any foreign state to own land for consular use, but only in
so far as it is necessary for such purpose, 'alien' shall be deemed to include the government
of any foreign state . " Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102, § 2 (St. Kitts-
Nevis 1922).
155. Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, ch. 102, § 3(a) (St. Kitts-Nevis 1922). The
provision says in effect that the alien may hold the land subject to right of the government,
as landlord, to reenter and take the land at the end of a one year tenency by the alien.
See id. The section aism provides that the Alien in this position may not hold more than
five acres of land. Id.
156. Id. § 3(b).
157. Id. § 3(c). Licenses for this purpose are routinely granted. Flemming Interview,
supra note 5.
158. Id. § 3(d).
159. Meguid Interview, supra note 74.
160. Telephone interview with Anthony Pace, Economic Development Officer, St. Kitts-
Nevis Mission to the United Nations, in New York City (Nov. 21, 1988) (on file at the
office of the N.Y.L. SCH J. INT'L & CoMp. L). Anguilla has a comparable development
scheme in its Aliens Landholding Regulation Ordinance, Statutory Rule Order No. 12
(Anguilla 1976). The development is designated The Maundays Bay Development Co. Ltd
(Statutory Rule Order 6). The government of Anguilla has also granted numerous
exceptions to the Landholding Regulation Ordinance. See Exemption Orders Nos. 14, 1977;
2, 1978; 13, 1980; 18, 1980; 2, 1981; 16, 1985.
161. Id
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F. Dominica
Dominica is another West Indian island which restricts foreign
ownership of land in its statutory scheme. The relevant Dominican
provision is the Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act (the "Dominican
Act").16
The Act defines a foreigner/alien as a "person not belonging to
Dominica,"16 which is further defined as a person "who was not born in
Dominica and who has not been ordinarily resident in the State con-
tinuously for a period of seven years or more."16
The Dominican Act is also different in that the determinations as to
the granting of the landholding license is left to a Minister, and not to
the Cabinet.166 Consequently, in Dominica, the decision to grant a
landholding license is concentrated in the hands of an individual rather
than in a government body. The power wielded by the Minister with
respect to the granting of landholding license is further reflected in
Section 5 (4A) (5) which states that the Minister "may" grant and issue
a license subject to such terms and conditions as he may consider
desirable.1 67
The concerns for Dominican economic development are illustrated
in the Dominican Act. The Act provides that an alien may be exempted
from the provisions of the Act by the Minister charged with responsi-
bility for development where the alien "is party to any agreement or
plan entered into with the Government of Dominica for financing the
building and development of housing, tourism, forestry or agriculture
"168
162. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
163. Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, Cap. 203 (Dominica 1961); amended by the
Alien Land Holding Regulation (Amendment) Act 21, § 2 (Dominica 1968).
164. Id. § 2.
165. Id. § 2(a).
166. Id. § 5(4A)(1). The provision states that, No alien or person not belonging to
Dominica shall conclude any agreement to hold land as owner or tenant or mortgagee for
estate or interest unless he first makes application in writing to the minister for the time
being charged with responsibility for the subject of land, and obtains from him a licence to
hold the land in question. Id.
167. Id. § 5.
168. Aliens Land Holding Regulation Act, Cap. 203 (Dominica 1961), amended by Aliens
Land Holding Regulation Act (Amendment) No. 3, § 20(1)(a) (Dotainica 1976). The
concern for maintaining local control for development is also reflected in Section 5(4A)(3)
and (4). Although the Immovable Property Act of the Bahamas does not provide for an
exemption for aliens wishing to invest in business enterprises, the Act nonetheless states
that the Board may, with respect to an application made under Section 5, "give special
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Provisions of the Dominican law also differ in that the application
for a landholding license must state specifically the "purpose for which
the land is to be utilized."169 The Act also requires that where the land
is to be used for "purposes connected with agriculture, the applicant
shall submit with his application such particulars as may be necessary to
enable the Minister to ensure that the land will be put to full and
efficient use."1t 0 The Act places similar requirements on real estate
development projects.17
The Dominican Act is in many ways similar to the laws of the other
countries surveyed, however, it is clear that the provisions of the Domini-
can Act do not adhere to the old laws as the much as other islands and
more vividly reflects the concerns for local control of economic develop-
ment.172
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey, and the existence of laws restricting foreign
ownership of land, demonstrate that West Indians are aware that there
is a great potential for foreign domination of their tiny islands by
foreigners."73 Although no figures exist on the success or failure of these
ordinances, it is evident that steps are being taken to maintain local
consideration to .. . for a permit where the immovable property is required for the
industrial, banking, or touristic project which is thought by the Board to be of special
benefit to... the Bahamas." Immovable Property Act, supra note 108, § 9(2). The Board
may also give special consideration to land which is to be used for agricultural purposes.
Id. § 9(3).
169. Alien Land Holding Regulation (Amendment), Act 21, § 5-4A(2)(b) (Dominica
1968).
170. Id. § 5-4A(3). Similarly, the Immovable Property Act of the Bahamas provides that
the alien who has acquired property pursuant to the Act must state "the purpose for which
the property will be used." The Immovable Property (Acquisition By Foreign Persons)
Regulations 1983, made under The Immovable Property (Acquisition By Foreign Persons)
Act 1981 § 7(1)(c). The Immovable Property Act names the Prime Minister as the
Chairman of the Foreign Investment Board which was "established for the purposes of [the]
Act." Id. § 3(1)(a)-(c). Pursuant to his role as Chairman of the Board, the Prime
Ministers' Office issued the Regulations cited above.
171. Aliens Land Holding Regulation (Amendment) Act 21, § 5-4A(4) (Dominica 1968)
provides:
Where the land is to be used for any building estate or development project
other than agriculture the applicant shall submit with his application detailed
plans of his project, approved by the Central Housing Planning Authority: and
shall observe such conditions as the Minister may from time to time stipulate to
ensure that the project is being carried out.
Id.
172. See, ag, supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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control over the one valuable resource many of the islands possess- the
land.
The desire for local control is an issue of great importance to the
people of the West Indies. Many commentators in the region are
increasingly voicing their concern that the West Indian relationship with
the United States is not fostering a sense of security and independence
in the people, 174 but is moving the region from a colonial relationship
with England to semi-colonial relationship with the United States.
While control of their economies is a worthy goal for the island
states of the West Indies to pursue (given that they are small developing
nations with a dire need for economic assistance), it should not be
expected that they will "completely repel foreign domination and develop
programs aimed at self-sufficiency." 17 But as the laws and policies
outlined above demonstrate, the autonomous interests are strong and will
remain so even though a reduction in growth will inevitably result.
Mark A. Gloade
174. See De Freitas, No Change in U.S. Caribbean Policy Expected, Carib News, Nov. 22,
1988, at 17, col. 1.
175. Note, supra note 46 at 233.
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